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Abstract 
Humans fail to fully understand the world around them and to recognize their limited 
understanding. The illusion of explanatory depth (IOED) exemplifies these failures: 
people believe they understand the world more than they actually do and only realize the 
illusory nature of this belief when they attempt to explain phenomena. An unexplored 
factor of the IOED is how people may become overconfident by confusing their own 
understanding with others’ understanding. In three experiments, I compared the IOED in 
devices, where it is typically examined, with mental health, a domain where society has a 
more limited understanding. In Experiment 1, I demonstrate that laypeople believe 
society understands mental health less than devices and that people demonstrate a smaller 
IOED in mental health than in devices. Experiment 2 shows that explanation is necessary 
for the illusion to be revealed in mental health. Finally, Experiment 3 suggests that 
explicitly describing others’ understanding as limited eliminates the illusion. Implications 
for meta-cognition and for mental health are discussed.  
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Introduction 
Humans encounter a vast number of phenomena on a daily basis but only possess 
a shallow level of understanding of most of these phenomena (Wilson & Keil, 1998). In 
addition to a limited understanding of many everyday domains, people lack an 
understanding of their own understanding and tend to believe that they are much more 
skilled in a variety of domains than they actually are (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & 
Kruger, 2003). In this thesis, I specifically explore the way that people fail to understand 
their own understanding by examining the illusion of explanatory depth (Rozenblit & 
Keil, 2002), people’s belief that they can explain a phenomenon better than they are 
actually able to. I first discuss explanations in general and then findings related to 
people’s illusory beliefs that they understand more than they do. I examine how these 
illusory beliefs may be supported by people’s propensity to confuse what they understand 
about a phenomenon with what other people understand about that phenomenon. I focus 
specifically on the mental health domain, a field where understanding is currently very 
limited.  
Explanations and the illusion of explanatory depth  
Explanations are attempts to increase understanding of a phenomenon by 
illuminating several aspects of that phenomenon (Kitcher, 1981; Wilson & Keil, 1998). 
An explanation for a phenomenon almost always involves descriptions of the causes 
(e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986) and in particular, reveals the complex system of 
mechanisms that contributes to the phenomenon (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Glennan, 
2002). People have an innate drive to explain phenomena in the world (Gopnik, 2000; 
Kosslyn, 1995), with explanation being described as central to human understanding and 
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communication (Lombrozo, 2006). Explanation serves as a particularly important driving 
force in the field of science, where researchers seek to generate an explanation for why or 
how a phenomenon happens that accurately reflects the reality of that phenomenon (e.g., 
Salmon, 1989; Strevens, 2008). Overall, explanations serve an important role in human 
reasoning. 
Explanations can be useful in helping people to evaluate their own 
comprehension. When people attempt to generate an explanation for a phenomenon, they 
not only learn what they know but also become aware of “gaps” in their understanding: 
those parts of the explanation that are difficult or impossible to generate (Keil, Rozenblit, 
& Mills, 2004). That is, people are often unaware of what they do not know until they try 
to explain it, as demonstrated by the illusion of explanatory depth (IOED). First studied 
by Rozenblit and Keil (2002), the illusion of explanatory depth is the wrongly held belief 
that one understands aspects of the world on a deeper level than one actually does. This 
illusion is only revealed to participants when they attempt to generate an explanation for 
a phenomenon and their true level of understanding is exposed.  
 The central part of the procedure that Rozenblit and Keil used to elucidate the 
illusion of explanatory depth is as follows. Participants were presented with a list of 
devices (e.g., a cylinder lock) and asked to rate their understanding of how each device 
worked. Next, they were asked to write a detailed, step-by-step explanation of several test 
items from the list (e.g., explain how a cylinder lock operates) and then again rated their 
own understanding of that phenomenon. In several different populations, Rozenblit and 
Keil consistently found that ratings of understanding for how a device worked were 
significantly lower after generating a detailed explanation than they were initially. This 
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finding suggests that people do not actually understand the mechanisms of many 
everyday devices as much as they believe they do and only realize that they lack 
understanding after attempting to explain. The IOED has been shown in the domains of 
devices (Lawson, 2006; Mills & Keil, 2004; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002), natural phenomena 
(Rozenblit & Keil, 2002), and political policy (Alter, Oppenheimer, & Zemla, 2010; 
Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013).   
Explanations for the illusion of explanatory depth 
Several explanations have been given for the IOED, which fall broadly into two 
groups: 1) people overestimate the quality and depth of their mental representations, and 
2) people fail to accurately judge their ability to provide good explanations. Within the 
idea that people overestimate their own mental representations, the IOED has been 
specifically linked to how people encode complex causal systems. First, explanatory 
knowledge can have many different levels and people can confuse a surface level 
understanding of a causal system for a more detailed one, causing them to hold the 
illusion that they understand more deeply than they actually do (Keil, 2003; Mills & Keil, 
2004; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). For example, people may know that a cylinder lock 
works by inserting a key and turning it, which causes the lock to unlock. This 
understanding might lead people to believe that they know how a lock works, even 
though they lack an understanding of the detailed internal mechanisms of the lock. In 
short, people mistake their shallow representation of the device for a deeper 
understanding of causal mechanisms.  
Additionally, it is easier for people to explain an entity when it is directly in front 
of them because they can gain understanding of how an object’s mechanisms work by 
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simply examining the object. Often, people have mental representations that they think 
are just as real as the actual object. It is only after attempting to generate an explanation 
that people realize how meager these representations are (Keil, 2003; Mills & Keil, 2004; 
Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). For example, it is easy to conjure a mental image of a zipper 
opening and closing but when actually trying to explain a zipper, it becomes clear that 
this mental image is not actually as helpful as having the object in sight. Rozenblit and 
Keil (2002) found that people held a larger illusion for devices where they perceived a 
greater proportion of the parts as being visible, suggesting that people may put more faith 
in their mental images when these images represent devices with more explicitly visible 
mechanisms.  
 Not only do people fail to understand the ways in which their mental 
representations do not accurately reflect reality, they also fail to accurately assess their 
own ability to provide explanations. First, people are not typically called upon to produce 
detailed explanations and thus, cannot use their previous experiences to predict their 
success in generating explanations (Mills & Keil, 2004; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). People 
often provide facts and tell narratives, so they can more accurately predict how they will 
perform on such tasks. However, people may not realize the difficulty of explaining a set 
of complex mechanisms until they actually attempt to do so, which could lead them to 
overestimate their ability to generate such explanations.  
Additionally, because explanations of complex devices can have many different 
levels, it can be difficult to judge what levels are necessary to include in a good 
explanation (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). When explaining a procedure, one typically knows 
the end result of the procedure and understands that a good explanation of the procedure 
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would need to include each step needed to achieve this result but would not include 
something like the mechanics that allow the human body to move to perform the 
procedure. Contrast this type of explanation with an explanation of a device, e.g., how a 
flush toilet works. A good explanation might include the way the device is used (e.g., 
flush the handle and the water is removed), the working of parts inside the tank, the 
physics behind the water removal, and more. Because it is much more difficult to 
determine which of these elements are necessary and sufficient for a good explanation, it 
is hard to easily assess one’s ability to generate an explanation without actually doing so. 
Therefore, people’s initial judgments of their ability to explain this type of system are 
less likely to be accurate.  
The IOED and the Division of Cognitive Labor 
Studies of the IOED demonstrate the fallacies that people make in evaluating their 
own understanding. Importantly though, people can and do rely on more than just their 
own understanding when generating explanations; they often seek out the understanding 
of others. People recognize that their own understanding has limits (even if they are 
inaccurate about where these limits lie) and use their understanding of what others know 
when choosing who to turn to fill in gaps in their own understanding (Keil, 2012; 
Wegner, 1987; Wilson & Keil, 1998). Wilson and Keil (1998) first postulated the idea of 
a division of cognitive labor for explanatory understanding: the idea that any given 
individual only has a limited understanding of most phenomena and “outsources” the 
work of understanding these phenomena more deeply to others. These others can be 
experts in a field, such as when people go to a mechanic with a car problem. However, 
people often outsource their understanding to non-expert others. For instance, upon 
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facing a car problem, an individual might call a friend who worked on her own car or 
seek out an Internet forum for people who have had similar car problems. From an early 
age, children develop skills in navigating the division of cognitive labor by learning to 
identify which individuals would be able to explain different phenomena (Danovitch & 
Keil, 2004; Keil et al., 2008; Lutz & Keil, 2002).  
The division of cognitive labor is necessary for people to make sense of the world 
without needing to develop an impossibly overwhelming amount of understanding in 
their own minds. In fact, it is rare that one’s understanding is evaluated in isolation from 
others’ understanding, as people can typically seek answers from others. Recent work 
suggests that because people so commonly rely on others for understanding, they may 
actually overestimate the amount of understanding that they possess in seclusion from 
others. Fisher, Goddu, and Keil (2015) demonstrated that when people used the Internet 
to search for explanations, they later perceived their ability to explain a different set of 
phenomenon as greater compared to people who did not use the Internet. The researchers 
postulated that searching the Internet led people to conflate an understanding in the world 
with an understanding in their own mind: that they misjudged where the division of 
cognitive labor actually lay, believing that they possessed a larger proportion of the total 
accessible understanding on a topic than they actually did. Similarly, Kominsky and Keil 
(2014) showed that people had an illusory belief that they could generate more 
differences between two similar words than they actually could and that this illusion was 
larger for pairs where people believed that experts would know more. These findings 
suggest that the presence of the IOED may be in part facilitated by conflating the 
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understanding of a field that exists outside an individual’s own mind with the 
understanding within one’s mind.    
Evidence that confusing others understanding and one’s own understanding may 
lead to an illusion can help to explain why the illusion has been shown in previously 
tested domains. In particular, in the domain of devices, a deep level of understanding 
exists in the world. For example, there are people who understand devices like cylinder 
locks very well, even if the average person has a limited understanding of how a cylinder 
lock works. Thus, the average individual may overestimate their own understanding of a 
cylinder lock because they recognize that they can outsource their understanding of locks 
to others. If an illusion arises in part from a confusion of personal and others’ 
understanding, this begs the question of whether people would still demonstrate an 
illusion in a domain where understanding is limited for everyone. That is, would the 
illusion exist in a domain where personal understanding and others’ understanding should 
both be low? For instance, in the domain of mental health, even the experts with the 
greatest level of understanding currently have fairly little understanding of the basis of 
disorders and of treatments. In the following, I describe current limits in understanding of 
the mental health domain. I then explain a series of experiments examining whether 
perceptions of an overall understanding of a field facilitates an illusion of explanatory 
depth for that field, focusing particularly on the mental health domain.  
Current understanding of mental health 
First, I must emphasize the difference between knowledge and understanding. 
Many mental health researchers and clinicians know a lot about disorders and treatments 
but as of yet, this knowledge has not yet translated to a deep or comprehensive 
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understanding. For example, the current understanding of the causal mechanisms leading 
to mental health problems is incomplete as well. Disorders are often conceptualized as 
products of environmental, psychological, and biological factors working together (e.g., 
Engel, 1977; Kendler, 2005) but little is truly understood about how these factors 
interplay to lead to disorders. For instance, researchers can currently identify a number of 
developmental, genetic and cognitive factors that seem to contribute to the onset and 
maintenance of schizophrenia (Matheson, Shepherd, & Carr, 2014) but do not yet have a 
real understanding of how schizophrenia occurs. Research has only scratched the surface 
of understanding the complex interactions between causal factors of mental disorders.  
Even the mechanisms through which the treatments for mental health conditions 
are effective are unknown. For example, there is a large body of research demonstrating 
the efficacy of psychotropic drugs, but while it is known that they work by altering brain 
chemistry, there is still a limited understanding of how these alterations lead to 
improvements or why medications work differentially across individuals (e.g., Malhotra, 
Murphy, & Kennedy, 2004; Zhang & Malhotra, 2013). Likewise, the effectiveness of 
psychotherapy has been consistently demonstrated but the mechanisms that lead to 
change in therapy are still unknown: research is mixed on whether it is the specific 
factors of a certain type of therapy (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy) or the common 
factors shared by all therapies (e.g., therapeutic alliance) that make a difference (e.g., 
Kazdin, 2007; Wampold & Imel, 2015). Again, there is knowledge about the treatments 
that are effective but not an understanding of why these treatments are helpful.   
In the following set of experiments, I examine the IOED in mental health in order 
to better understand the role that beliefs about others’ understanding of a domain may 
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have in creating the IOED. Given that others’ understanding may facilitate an illusion of 
one’s own understanding, I examine whether people still show an IOED for mental health 
and if so, how this illusion compares in magnitude to that previously demonstrated in 
devices. To further clarify the possible relationship of such beliefs producing the IOED, I 
assess whether people’s beliefs about others’ understanding are related to overestimations 
of their own understanding. 
Overview of Experiments 
I conducted three experiments exploring the illusion of explanatory depth in the 
mental health domain and how that illusion is related to the understanding of others. In 
Experiment 1, I tested whether differences in understanding across domains corresponded 
to differences in the size of the IOED. In Experiment 2, I tested whether explanation was 
necessary to reveal the illusion in mental disorders to ensure that the demonstrated effect 
did not result from other factors. Finally, in Experiment 3, I examined whether explicitly 
manipulating the perceived understanding of others influenced the IOED.  
Experiment 1: The IOED in the Mental Health Domain 
 In Experiment 1, I examined the IOED in mental disorders and mental health 
treatments using the basic IOED procedure developed by Rozenblit and Keil (2002) and 
compared the IOED in mental health items (disorders and treatments) to the illusion in 
devices. First, in order to demonstrate that laypeople actually believe that mental 
disorders are less understood than devices.  To measure this, I ran a pretest where I asked 
participants (N = 50) to rate their beliefs about others’ understanding of mental health, as 
well as devices, natural phenomena, and medical disorders. For each domain, participants 
rated their agreement that “we fully understand” the phenomenon (society rating) on a 
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scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). They also rated the difference 
between what an expert would know about each topic and what the average person knows 
about that topic (gap rating) on a scale of 1 (no difference) to 7 (very great difference). I 
found that on average people reported higher society understanding ratings for devices 
(M = 5.73) than for mental disorders (M = 3.72; p < .001). Likewise, people reported 
larger expert-novice differences for mental disorders (M = 5.64) than for devices (M = 
3.73; p < .001). These findings demonstrate that people actually see mental disorders as 
less understood by others than devices.  
I hypothesized that overall, people would show overconfidence in their own 
understanding because they confuse it with others’ understanding. Since people endorse a 
lower amount of understanding in others for mental health than devices, I predicted that 
people would have smaller initial ratings for mental health phenomena than for devices. 
As a result, after explaining, ratings would show a smaller drop for mental items than for 
devices, demonstrating a smaller illusion than in devices. 
 In addition to devices, mental disorders, and mental treatments, I also examined 
the illusion in medical disorders and medical treatments. Given that medical items were 
between devices and mental items in terms of how well understood by society they were 
perceived to be, observing the illusion in medical items provides a more nuanced look at 
exactly how personal and others’ understanding are related. It may be that people 
demonstrate an illusion in medical items that is smaller than in devices but larger than in 
mental items. However, the lay/expert gap in understanding is seen as similar for medical 
and mental items, which may predict a similar sized illusion. Additionally, finding that no 
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illusion exists for either medical or mental disorders could suggest that the illusion 
simply does not extend to health phenomena.  
 I also examined the correlations between beliefs about the general level of 
understanding and ratings of participants’ own understanding, both before and after 
generating an explanation. I expected that if people confuse their own understanding with 
what others understand, that perceptions of the amount of societal understanding would 
be correlated with ratings of personal understanding prior to generating an explanation 
across all domains. However, I did not expect perceptions of societal level understanding 
to relate to ratings of personal understanding after explaining, because explanations allow 
people to accurately judge their own understanding, rather than confusing others’ 
understanding with their own.  
 Additionally, I examined the correlations between beliefs about the gap between 
lay and expert knowledge and participants ratings of personal understanding. I anticipated 
that a perception of a smaller gap between lay and expert knowledge would allow for 
more confusion between personal and others’ understanding, given that understanding is 
more widely spread across individuals, rather than being more concentrated in experts. 
Thus, I anticipated that perception of a smaller gap would be correlated with higher 
ratings of personal understanding prior to generating an explanation but not following the 
generation of an explanation in all domains.  
Method  
Participants. Participants were 251 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers.  
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Materials and Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to see items 
from one of five domains: devices, mental disorders, mental treatments, medical 
disorders, or medical treatments. Participants rated five items from the given domain.   
Participants learned how to rate their understanding of phenomena using a 1 to 7 
scale taken from Rozenblit and Keil (2002). Instructions included examples of a 7, 4, and 
1 level understanding of a crossbow. Participants then rated each item on this scale (Time 
1 [T1] rating). Then, participants were presented with each item, one by one, and 
prompted to explain each item in as much detail as possible. Exact instructions are as 
follows: 
“As best you can, please describe all the details you know about [ITEM], going 
from the first step to the last, and providing the causal connection between the 
steps. That is, your explanation should state precisely how each step causes the 
next step in one continuous chain from start to finish. In other words, try to tell as 
complete a story as you can, with no gaps. Please take your time, as we expect 
your best explanation.”  
After each explanation, participants were asked to again rate their understanding 
of the item (Time 2 [T2] rating). Finally, participants made several follow-up ratings. For 
each item, participants made the same society and gap ratings as in the pretest. However, 
unlike in the pretest, these ratings were completed after participants had assessed their 
own understanding of items and attempted to explain these items. Additionally, 
participants answered some basic demographic questions, including questions related to 
expertise in the domains of interest. All questions were presented using Qualtrics survey 
software.  
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Results 
 Data analysis. Nine participants had worked in one of these domains in the past 
(e.g., in a mental health treatment center), so their data were dropped from final analyses, 
leaving a sample of 242. For T1, T2, society, and gap ratings, I averaged across all five 
items to create overall mean scores. These scores showed acceptable to good internal 
consistency across items in all domains, all αs > .69. 
 The Illusion. In order to examine the illusion across domains, I conducted a 5 
(domain: devices vs. medical disorders vs. mental disorders vs. medical treatments vs. 
mental treatments; between) x 2 (time: T1 vs. T2; within) ANOVA, as in Rozenblit and 
Keil (2002). I conducted Sidak-corrected follow-up corrections to explore interactions.  
 Analyses showed a significant effect of time, F(1, 237) = 62.37, p < .001, with 
ratings of personal understanding higher at T1 (M = 3.31) than T2 (M = 2.80). Thus, 
averaging across all domains, participants’ endorsement of their own understanding 
decreased after explaining. Results also showed a significant effect of domain, F(4, 237) 
= 3.45, p = .009. However, this effect should be interpreted in light of a significant time 
X domain interaction, F(4, 237) = 4.79, p = .001.  
Follow-up comparisons showed the expected illusion in devices, as ratings 
significantly dropped from T1 to T2, p < .001. Additionally, this drop was also 
significant in mental disorders, p = .041, and in mental and medical treatments, ps < .001. 
However, ratings did not drop from T1 to T2 for medical disorders, p = .669. Overall, 
participants showed an illusion in devices, mental disorders, mental treatments and 
medical treatments but not medical disorders (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Personal understanding by time.  
In order to compare the size of the illusion across domains, I examined this 
interaction another way. I predicted that the illusion would be smaller in mental disorders 
and treatments than in devices. At T1, ratings for devices were marginally higher than 
those for medical treatments, p = .077, and significantly higher than all other domains, all 
ps < .022. However, at T2, ratings did not differ between domains, all ps > .120. Given 
that ratings for devices were greater than other domains at T1 but the same at T2, 
participants showed a greater drop (and thus a larger illusion) for devices than for mental 
health phenomena, as expected. The illusion was also smaller in medical treatments than 
in devices and was non-existent in medical disorders.  
 Perceived understanding of others. I also examined participants’ society and 
gap ratings (see Table 1). I first compared ratings across domains by conducting a 5 
(domain: devices vs. mental disorders vs. mental treatments vs. medical disorders vs. 
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medical treatments; within) ANOVA for both ratings. I predicted that as in the pretest, 
devices would be seen as more understood than medical items, which would in turn be 
seen as more understood than mental items. There was a significant effect of domain on 
society ratings, F(4, 237) = 4.12, p = .003. Follow-up comparisons showed that devices 
were seen as more understood than mental treatments, p = .011, but were only marginally 
more understood than mental disorders, p = .058, and were not seen as more understood 
than medical items, ps > .883. Mental treatments were seen as less understood than 
medical disorders, p = .047, but not medical treatments, p = .398, and mental disorders 
were not seen as different than medical items, ps > .188. Finally, mental disorders and 
treatments were seen as equally well understood, p = 1.00. Unlike in the pretest, medical 
items were not seen as more understood than mental disorders or less understood than 
devices, and did not differ from one another.  
 There was also a main effect of domain on gap ratings, F(4, 237) = 9.96, p < .001. 
I predicted that the gap would be seen as smaller for devices than for medical and mental 
items. Follow-up comparisons showed that people saw the gap between lay and expert 
understanding as smaller for devices than all other items, all ps < .002. There were no 
differences between other domains, all ps > .600. Overall, these results show the same 
basic findings as the pretest, in which devices are seen as more understood and having a 
smaller lay/expert gap in understanding than mental disorders and treatments.  
Table 1 
Mean society/gap ratings by domain.  
 Society rating Gap rating 
Devices 4.40 (0.21) 4.85 (0.15) 
Medical Treatments 4.27 (0.22) 5.92	(0.16) 
	 	17
Medical Disorders 4.00 (0.22) 6.08 (0.16) 
Mental Treatments 3.56 (0.22) 5.71 (0.16) 
Mental Disorders 3.41 (0.21) 5.84 (0.15) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses  
 Next, I examined whether individual’s ratings on these two measures correlated 
with their T1 and T2 ratings. I predicted that society ratings would be positively 
correlated with T1 ratings but not T2 ratings, and that gap ratings would be negatively 
correlated with T1 ratings but not T2 ratings. Overall, society ratings were positively 
correlated with both T1, r = .221, p = .001, and T2 ratings, r = .358, p < .001, suggesting 
that higher ratings of other’s understanding were related to higher personal understanding 
at both T1 and T2. Gap ratings were also correlated with both T1, r = -.249, p < .001, and 
T2 ratings, r = -.214, p < .001, such that larger perceived differences between lay and 
expert knowledge were related to lower personal understanding at both T1 and T2. 
Predictions were supported for correlations at T1 but correlations were also found at T2.  
Finally, I examined whether correlations between society/gap ratings and personal 
understanding held across all domains as expected. For society ratings (see Table 2), 
higher ratings were correlated with T1 and T2 ratings for devices and mental disorders (rs 
> .280, ps < .045). However, higher ratings were only correlated with T2 ratings for 
medical and mental treatments (rs > .325, ps < .025) and were only marginally correlated 
with T2 ratings for medical disorders (r = .251, p = .089). Society ratings related more to 
T2 than T1 ratings across domains and were only correlated with T1 ratings for devices 
and mental disorders. Thus, the anticipated relationship between society and T1 ratings 
was only found in devices and mental disorders.  
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Table 2 
Society rating correlations by domain.  
 T1 T2 
Devices .290* .412** 
Medical Treatments .150 .326* 
Medical Disorders .131 .251 
Mental Treatments .137 .352* 
Mental Disorders .310* .400** 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.  
 For gap ratings (see Table 3), larger perceived gaps were correlated with lower 
ratings for mental disorders at T1 (r = -.315, p = .029) and T2 (r = -.491, p < .001). 
Larger differences were also marginally correlated with T1 ratings for medical disorders 
(r = -.259, p = .078) and mental treatments (r = -.271, p = .057). Differences were not 
correlated with ratings for devices or medical treatments, rs < .036, ps > .540. The 
predicted relationship between gap ratings and personal understanding was found only in 
the domain of mental disorders, not across all domains. 
Table 3 
Gap rating correlations by domain.  
 T1 T2 
Devices .035 .011 
Medical Treatments .014 -.090 
Medical Disorders -.259 -.239 
Mental Treatments -.271 .081 
Mental Disorders -.315* -.491** 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.  
Discussion  
Experiment 1 provides a first look at people’s meta-knowledge in mental health, a 
scientific domain where understanding is very limited. People show an IOED in mental 
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disorders, mental treatments, and medical treatments, showing that the IOED extends 
across a number of health domains. Importantly, the illusion was larger in devices than in 
mental items: ratings were higher than mental items for devices at T1 but not at T2. One 
potential reason is that people confuse the understanding of the field at large with their 
own understanding at T1. Because the understanding for mental health is seen as more 
limited, people initially experience less confusion between others’ understanding and 
their own in mental health domains than in devices. As a result, ratings at T1 are lower 
for mental items, where people perceive a more limited understanding, and thus, are 
closer to their own actual levels of understanding for mental disorders and treatments 
than devices.  
People fail to show an illusion for medical disorders, suggesting that people make 
fairly accurate T1 judgments about their understanding of medical disorders. Medical 
disorders are seen as less understood than devices and understanding is seen as more 
concentrated in experts, so one would expect a smaller illusion in medical disorders than 
devices. In addition, other factors that contribute to the IOED in devices may not be 
present in medical disorders. People hear explanations for medical disorders much more 
than for devices, mental items, or medical treatments. Doctors frequently explain to 
patients how the symptoms of their disorder develop. Because of this, people may have a 
better idea of what a good explanation looks like for medical disorders, and as a result, 
may be able to more accurately forecast the quality of explanation that they will be able 
to generate. In combination with lower levels of others’ understanding and a greater 
concentration of understanding in experts, a greater accuracy about the contents of a good 
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explanation may help eliminate the illusion in medical disorders. Other possible reasons 
for the lack of an IOED in medical disorders should be investigated in future research.  
 In addition to examining the illusion across domains, I also again examined 
perceptions of others’ understanding and the lay/expert gap across domains. While there 
were still differences in society and gap ratings across domain, there were fewer 
differences than found in the pretest. This is likely due to the fact that society and gap 
ratings were done after individuals had rated their own understanding and explained, 
which may have altered these ratings. I have discussed the idea that people’s beliefs 
about others’ understanding may influence beliefs about their own understanding but the 
reverse may also be true: the altered beliefs about personal understanding caused by the 
experiment may have impacted beliefs about what others understand. In particular, 
people may have based ratings of others’ understanding on their accurate beliefs about 
their own understanding, explaining the stronger correlations with T2 ratings than T1 
ratings.  
I also found differences in the relationships between society and gap ratings and 
personal understanding across domains. I predicted that across all domains, society and 
gap ratings would be related to personal understanding but find that society ratings are 
only related to personal understanding at T1 for devices and mental disorders and that 
gap ratings are only related to personal understanding of mental disorders (at both T1 and 
T2). Again, one explanation is that in generating an explanation, participants’ perceptions 
of others’ understanding were altered, which concealed the true relationships between 
these constructs. For instance, in the domain of devices, the difficulty of generating an 
explanation seems to have lowered society/gap ratings as compared with pretest ratings, 
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which may have occluded the real relationship between prior beliefs about others’ 
understanding and personal understanding.  
Experiment 2: Is Explanation Necessary to Reveal the Illusion? 
 An important part of the IOED phenomenon is the idea that attempting to 
generate an explanation is necessary to reveal the illusion. Thus, to ensure that the IOED 
functions the same way in mental disorders as in devices, Experiment 2 examined 
whether the same drop would occur in personal understanding of mental disorders after 
simply describing (e.g., listing symptoms, risk factors, etc.) disorders, rather than 
explaining. A similar paradigm has been deployed in examining people’s illusion of 
understanding for political policies (Fernbach et al., 2013). People were asked to either 
explain how a policy would work or to list the reasons that they agreed or disagreed with 
a policy. The IOED was only revealed to those who had explained the policy, not simply 
listed reasons for their beliefs about a policy. Thus, this experiment serves to extend this 
basic finding to mental disorders.  
Why might simply listing characteristics of mental disorders reveal the illusion 
for mental health? First, laypeople tend to automatically assume causal relationships 
between features of phenomena including mental disorders (e.g., Ahn & Kim, 2002). 
Thus, listing symptoms and factors that could contribute to mental disorders may cause 
people to spontaneously generate links between these items that could have the same 
impact of an explanation on their perception of their own understanding. Secondly, 
people may have more familiarity with the devices that they interact with on a daily basis 
(e.g., a zipper) than they do with mental disorders. Thus, it may be difficult for people to 
even list characteristics of disorders, which could lower their perceptions that they 
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understand how disorders work. Despite these possibilities, I predicted that participants 
would only show a drop in personal understanding after explaining, not after listing 
characteristics. In Experiment 2, I compared T1 and T2 ratings when participants were 
asked to explain mental disorders and simply list characteristics of mental disorders. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were one hundred Amazon Mechanical Turk workers.  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either the 
explanation or description condition. Participants in both conditions rated their 
understanding of eight mental disorders as in Experiment 1. After the initial ratings, 
participants then either explained or described disorders. The explanation condition was 
identical to Experiment 1, with the only change being that participants rated eight 
disorders, rather than five.  Participants in the description condition were asked to list all 
of the characteristics that they know about each disorder, rather than explaining each 
disorder. Exact instructions are as follows: 
“As best you can, please list all the characteristics you know about [ITEM] 
including things like symptoms, typical attributes of someone with the disorder, risk 
factors and so on. Try to list as many characteristics as you can. Press the return key 
between each separate item that you list. Please take your time, as we expect your best 
list.” 
After listing characteristics, participants again rated their understanding (T2 
rating). Then, all participants completed several follow-up ratings. For each disorder, 
they completed three ratings assessing how biologically, psychologically and 
environmentally caused the disorder was, on a scale from 0, not at all biologically/ 
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psychologically/environmentally caused, to 100, completely biologically/ 
psychologically/environmentally caused. These ratings were included for analyses not 
reported here and will not be discussed further. Additionally, participants completed 
society, gap and demographic questions as in Experiment 1.  
Results  
Data analysis. Two participants endorsed working in a mental health setting, so 
their data was dropped from final analyses, leaving a sample of ninety-eight. For T1, T2, 
society, and gap ratings, I averaged across all eight items to create overall scores.  
The illusion. To examine whether description can reveal the illusion in mental 
disorders, I conducted a 2 (condition: understanding vs. knowledge) x 2 (time: T1 vs. T2) 
mixed ANOVA. Results showed a significant effect of time, F(1, 96) = 6.84, p = .010, 
with ratings higher at T1 (M = 2.86, SD = 0.13) than T2 (M = 2.63, SD = 0.13). There 
was also a significant effect of condition, F(1,96) = 4.21, p = .043, with personal 
understanding rated lower in the explanation condition (M = 2.49, SD = 0.18) than the 
description condition (M = 3.00, SD = 0.17).   
These effects should be interpreted in light of a significant interaction between 
time and condition, F(1, 96) = 11.71, p = .001. I predicted that ratings would drop from 
T1 to T2 in the explanation condition but not in the description condition. Follow-up 
Sidak-corrected comparisons show that ratings significantly dropped from T1 to T2 in the 
explanation condition, p < .001, but not in the description condition, p = .564 (see Figure 
2). Examining this interaction another way, ratings between conditions did not differ at 
T1, p = .454, but are significantly lower at T2 for the explanation condition than the 
description condition, p = .002. Thus, participants in both conditions endorsed the same 
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initial level of understanding but only those who explained their understanding showed a 
drop at T2. The illusion was only demonstrated in participants who generated 
explanations for mental disorders, not those who simply listed characteristics.  
	  
Figure 2. Personal understanding across condition.  
 Perceived understanding of others. First, I compared society and gap ratings 
across conditions. Neither society ratings M = 3.70, SD = 1.32, t(96) = .037, p = .759, nor 
gap ratings, M = 5.74, SD = 1.13, t(96) = .996, p = .648 differed across conditions. I then 
examined correlations split by condition. For the description condition, society ratings 
were correlated with T1, r = .370, p = .008, and T2 ratings, r = .408, p = .003, and gap 
ratings were uncorrelated with T1 ratings, r = -.171, p = .234, and marginally correlated 
with T2 ratings, r = -.269, p = .059. In the explanation condition, participants showed a 
different pattern. Society ratings were uncorrelated with T1 or T2 ratings, rs > .190, ps > 
.135, and gap ratings were correlated with T1, r = -.294, p = .042, and T2 ratings, r = -
.316, p = .029. Higher ratings of societal understanding were related to higher ratings of 
personal understanding but only in the description condition. Likewise, ratings of a larger 
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lay/expert gap were negatively related to personal understanding only in the explanation 
condition.  
Discussion  
 The major finding from this experiment is that, as predicted, explanation seems to 
be truly necessary to reveal the illusion. Simply thinking about the various aspects of a 
phenomenon is not enough to reveal one’s true level of understanding: those who did so 
remained just as overconfident about their understanding. People did not seem to 
spontaneously consider the causal links between the symptoms and risk factors that they 
generated, so creating a list was not useful in revealing one’s true level of understanding. 
This finding further demonstrates the useful nature of explanations in helping people to 
evaluate their true level of understanding in a way that other types of thinking do not. The 
illusion of explanatory depth seems to function the same way in mental disorders as it 
does in previously studied phenomena. 
 Additionally, I found that the relationships between perceived understanding of 
others and individual’s own understanding ratings differed across conditions. Personal 
understanding at both T1 and T2 was correlated with ratings of societal understanding 
only in the description condition and with gap ratings only in the explanation condition.  
This finding provides further evidence that the experiment actually impacted people’s 
ratings of others’ understanding. In particular, the fact that correlations differed across 
conditions for T1 ratings demonstrates that the act of either explaining or describing 
impacted later society/gap ratings. The conditions were only different after T1 ratings 
were made: thus, relationships should have been the same across conditions if society/gap 
ratings had not been altered. Despite the difficulty of interpreting these results, overall, it 
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seems that ratings of societal understanding and the lay/expert gap are related to 
individual’s ratings of understanding.  
Experiment 3: Manipulating Perceived Scientific Understanding 
So far, the proposed experiments have tested the illusion in mental health as 
related to the role that a field’s perceived understanding of a phenomenon plays in 
people’s perception of their own understanding of that phenomenon. In Experiment 3, I 
directly manipulated whether others are described as having high level or a low level of 
understanding of mental disorders in order to more directly test whether perceptions that 
others understand lead to an illusion of personal understanding. In light of the results of 
Experiment 1, which showed that people had a larger illusion for the most well 
understood field, I predicted that learning that mental disorders are well understood 
would lead people to overestimate their own personal understanding initially. Higher 
initial ratings would lead to a larger drop after explaining and a larger illusion. In 
contrast, I predicted that learning that there is a low level of understanding of mental 
disorders would reduce or eliminate the illusion: people would be unable to confuse 
others’ understanding with their own, since both are limited. 
 Method 
Participants. Participants were 101 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers.  
Materials and Procedure. Prior to completing ratings of understanding as in the 
previous experiments, participants were randomly assigned to read that scientists had a 
high level of understanding (high condition) or a low level of understanding (low 
condition) of mental health. Participants first read an artificial description of the current 
scientific understanding of a generally unfamiliar disorder (i.e., cyclothymic disorder) 
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and were told that this understanding reflected the level of scientific understanding for 
other mental disorders. In the high condition, scientists were portrayed as understanding 
the disorder well, while in the low condition, scientists were portrayed as lacking 
understanding. 
Results 
Data analysis. Two participants endorsed working in a mental health setting, so 
their data was dropped from final analyses, leaving a sample of ninety-nine participants. 
For T1, T2, society, and gap ratings, I averaged across all eight items to create overall 
scores.  
Quality of manipulation. First, I examined ratings related to the manipulation 
itself (see Table 4). Our manipulation check questions showed that the manipulation was 
effective in changing agreement that scientists understood cyclothymic disorder, t(93.66) 
= 8.33, p < .001, and other mental disorders, t(93.22) = 4.55, p < .001, with ratings higher 
in the high  than the low condition. Additionally, the described understanding was seen as 
equally likely to extend to other mental disorders, t(97) = 1.43, p = .156, and to apply to 
the same percentage of other disorders, t(95) = 1.05, p = .298, across condition. As 
expected, the high description was seen as a better quality explanation than the low 
description, t(97) = 3.50, p = .001. The high description was also seen as more plausible 
than the low description, t(96) = 2.81, p = .006.  
Table 4 
Mean manipulation ratings by condition.   
 Society rating Gap rating 
Understand Cyclothymic 5.02 (1.22) 2.78 (1.45) 
Understand Other Ment 4.56 (1.28) 3.27	(1.54) 
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Extend to Other Ment 61.08 (24.04) 54.12 (24.35) 
Percentage of Other Ment 52.53 (22.53) 47.73 (22.66) 
Quality of Explanation 4.46 (1.74) 3.33 (1.46) 
Plausibility  70.00 (24.49) 56.52 (22.91) 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses  
The illusion. In order to compare the illusion across high and low understanding 
conditions, I conducted a 2 (condition: high or low understanding; between) x 2 (time; 
within) mixed ANOVA. Results showed a significant effect of time, F(1, 97) = 16.83, p < 
.001, with ratings higher at T1 (M = 3.15) than T2 (M = 2.65) but no effect of condition, 
F(1,97) = 1.02, p = .304. However, results showed a significant interaction, F(1, 97) = 
6.05, p = .016. Follow-up comparisons showed a drop from T1 to T2 in the high 
condition, p < .001, but not in the low condition, p = .251 (see Figure 3). Examining the 
interaction in another way, ratings were higher in the high condition than the low 
condition at T1, p = .046, but not at T2, p = .885. As anticipated, participants showed an 
illusion when others were described as having a high level of understanding but not a low 
level of understanding.  
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Figure 3. Personal understanding across condition.  
Perceived understanding of others. I compared society and gap ratings across 
conditions. Neither society ratings, M = 3.59, SD = 1.34, t(97) = 1.34, p = .183, nor gap 
ratings, M = 5.70, SD = 1.05, t(97) = 0.31, p = .755, differed across conditions. Then, I 
examined the correlations between these ratings, T1 ratings and T2 ratings, split by 
condition. In the high condition, society ratings were significantly correlated with T1 (r = 
.334, p = .018) and T2 ratings (r = .387, p = .006), and gap ratings were significantly 
correlated with T2 ratings (r = -.450, p = .001). In the low condition, society and gap 
ratings were not correlated with T1 or T2 ratings (all ps > .165). Thus, ratings of societal 
level understanding and the lay/expert gap were only related to ratings in the high 
condition, not the low condition.  
Discussion  
 Experiment 3 shows that directly manipulating the perceived understanding of 
others influences people’s perceptions of their own understanding. In particular, learning 
that a field is well understood seems to inflate initial ratings of understanding, leading to 
a larger drop in understanding after explaining. On the other hand, the illusion is actually 
eliminated when people learn that a field is not well understood. This may be because 
people are then unable to confuse what they know with what others know, so they 
initially judge their own understanding more accurately. Along with results of 
Experiment 1, this finding provides converging evidence that the illusion is in part due to 
confusion between others’ understanding and one’s own personal understanding.  
 Ratings about the manipulation showed that people believed that the described 
understanding of cyclothymia was equally likely to extend to other disorders and to the 
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same percentage of disorders, regardless of condition. This shows that participants were 
not simply applying information from the description to more disorders in one condition 
than the other: the information was equally relevant to other disorders across condition. 
One issue with the descriptions was that they were unbalanced in terms of plausibility, 
with the well understood description seen as more plausible than the low understanding 
description. A useful future study would match descriptions on plausibility, to ensure that 
it is truly the level of understanding described that impacts people’s ratings. 
 Ratings of others’ understanding and perceived lay/expert gaps in understanding 
were only related to self-reports of understanding in the high condition, not in the low 
condition. This finding helps to provide further evidence that believing that others 
understand is an important component of the IOED. When others were portrayed as 
having a larger understanding of mental disorders, people may have confused others 
understanding with their own understanding, leading to relationships between ratings of 
other and self understanding. However, in the low condition, people may have based 
ratings of their own understanding on factors aside from others’ understanding, because 
others’ understanding was lacking.  
General Discussion 
The described experiments examined the illusion of explanatory depth in mental 
health, a domain where an understanding of complex causal mechanisms is extremely 
limited. Experiment 1 showed that people held an IOED for both mental disorders and 
mental health treatments, and that these illusions were smaller than in the device domain. 
Experiment 2 revealed that explanation is necessary to illuminate the illusion in mental 
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health and that just listing characteristics is not enough. Finally, Experiment 3 provided 
further evidence that believing that others understand underlies the illusion.  
I have provided evidence that perceptions of others’ understanding are an 
important cornerstone of the IOED. As discussed, a potential mechanism for the IOED is 
that people confuse what others understand with what they understand on their own and 
thus, overestimate their own understanding (e.g., Fisher et al., 2015). As shown by the 
findings of Experiment 1, in mental health, where others’ understanding is perceived as 
lower, people demonstrate a smaller illusion than in devices. People believe that there is 
less understanding overall, so even if they mistakenly believe that they possess a larger 
portion of this understanding than they actually do, they still believe that they understand 
less than they do in devices. Additionally, describing a lack of understanding in the field 
of mental health eliminated the illusion (Experiment 3). If people believe that the 
understanding of others is extremely limited, they are unable to misattribute a greater 
portion of others’ understanding to themselves and are thus more accurate about their 
own understanding. 
In extending the IOED to mental disorders, I also found that it functions similarly 
to the illusion in devices, in that only explanations are able to reveal the illusion 
(Experiment 2). Importantly, past work has mainly assessed the importance of 
explanation by showing that people show an illusion in domains with more complicated 
explanations (e.g., devices) but not in those where explanations are easier to generate 
(e.g., movie narratives; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). This is one of the only experiments that 
directly compares explanation to another type of higher-order thinking (listing 
characteristics) within the same domain. Additionally, this finding advances the study of 
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the IOED by supporting causal relationships as one of the fundamental aspects of 
explanations. People who were asked to list disorder characteristics generated symptoms 
and risk factors, which would be important in a good explanation of a disorder. However, 
they did not elucidate the causal relationships between these factors, which seems to have 
eliminated the power of explanation to illuminate the illusion.  
 Beyond examining the relationship between others’ understanding and the IOED, 
I also demonstrate that people hold an illusion for a wider range of domains than 
previously tested, including mental disorders and treatments. This domain extension 
demonstrates the robustness of the IOED phenomenon. People do not seem to 
overestimate their understanding in just a few select domains; instead, they consistently 
hold illusions of their own understanding across a number of disparate phenomena. In 
particular, the finding that people hold an IOED for mental disorders shows that people 
not only demonstrate an illusion for external, non-human phenomena (e.g., devices) but 
also for phenomena that happen within people. This extension across a larger number of 
domains is a novel one that supports the fundamental nature of the IOED.  
One particularly interesting implication of the finding that people have an IOED 
in the mental health domain is that mental disorders are internal and invisible to 
observers. In the past, visibility has been linked to the IOED, with people demonstrating 
a larger illusion for devices with more visible parts (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). 
Additionally, one factor described as underlying the IOED is that people wrongly believe 
that their mental images of a device are just as useful in understanding as actually seeing 
the device. Yet even in mental disorders, where processes are not at all visible, people 
still hold an illusion. This finding suggests that while perceptions of visibility may 
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contribute to the presence of an illusion, they are not necessary for people to hold an 
IOED.  
Implications 
 This set of experiments has implications for mental health clinicians. First, by 
confirming that an IOED exists in mental health and demonstrating that explanation is an 
important tool in achieving accuracy about one’s own understanding of mental health, 
these findings suggest that explanations should be used by both clinicians and patients in 
dealing with mental health issues. For example, clinicians frequently use data from the 
client to produce a conceptualization of the client’s problems, which is then used to guide 
the treatment process (e.g., Sperry, 2005; Sperry & Sperry, 2012). It is important that in 
these conceptualizations, the clinician fully elaborates the causal relationships between 
the client’s problems, as well as other important factors in the client’s life, in order to 
ensure that they have a complete understanding of the case. Findings from Experiment 2 
suggest that it is important that these explanations are explicit and coherent: if they 
simply represent descriptions of problems, without causal connections, clinicians may be 
overconfident in their own understanding, leading them to overlook aspects of their 
problems for which they do not have a good understanding.  
 Additionally, evidence that an illusion of understanding may be facilitated by a 
perception that others understand has implications for how experts communicate their 
level of understanding. In particular, it suggests that overstating the current state of the 
field’s understanding may not only be deceptive, but could also serve to make people 
overconfident in their own understanding. This could have a particularly detrimental 
impact in the field of mental health. In the United States, one in five people is 
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diagnosable with a mental illness yearly (SAMHSA, 2014) and an overconfidence in 
one’s understanding may reduce one’s impetus to seek treatment or information related to 
mental health. More broadly, experts should recognize that the way that they 
communicate their understanding may have large impacts on how people see their own 
understanding.  
 Generally, this set of experiments further extends work demonstrating the 
robustness of the IOED phenomenon and the phenomenon’s extent over multiple 
domains, including mental disorders, medical treatments, and mental health treatments. 
Additionally, the experiments provide support for a mechanism that has only recently 
been examined: the idea that people mistake others’ understanding for their own and that 
this is what leads people to initially overestimate their understanding. As research on 
mental health issues progresses, understanding will only increase but until an infinitely 
distant future, people must work with the limited understanding that they possess: this set 
of experiments helps to better explain how people do so.  
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